Federalist #68
The Mode of Electing the President
(By Alexander Hamilton)
The mode of appointment of the Chief
Magistrate of the
United States is almost the only part of the system, of any consequence, which
has escaped without severe censure or which has recieved the slightest mark of
approbation from its opponents. The most plausible of these, who
has appeared in print, has even
deigned to admit that the
election of the
President is pretty well guarded. [
1]
I venture somewhat further, and hesitate not to affirm that if the manner of it be not perfect, it is at least excellent. It unites in an eminent
degree all the advantages the union of which was to be desired.
It was desirable that the sense of the people should operate in the choice of the person to whom so important a trust was to be confided. This end
will be answered by committing the right of making it, not to any pre-established body, but to men chosen by the people for the special purpose,
and at the particular
conjuncture.
It was equally desirable that the immediate
election should be made by men most capable of analyzing the qualities adapted to the station and
acting under circumstances favorable to
deliberation, and to a
judicious combination of all the reasons and
inducements which were proper to
govern their choices. A small number of persons, selected by their fellow-
citizens from the general mass, will be most likely to possess the
information and discernment
requisite to so complicated an investigation.
It was also peculiarly desirable to to afford as little opportunity as possible to
tumult and
disorder. This
evil was not least to be
dreaded in the
election of a
magistrate who was to have so important an
agency in the
administration of the government as the
President
of the United States. But the precautions which have been so happily concerted in the system under consideration promise an effectual security
against this
mischief. The choice of
several to form an intermediate body of electors will be much less apt to convulse the community with
any extraordinary or violent movements than the choice of one who was himself to be the final object of the public wishes. And as the
electors, chosen in each
State, are to assemble and
vote in the State in which they are
chosen, this
detached and
divded situation will
expose them much less to heats and
ferments, which might be communicated from them to the people, than if they were all to be convened at one
time, in one place.
Nothing was more to be desired than that every practicable obstacle should be opposed to
cabal,
intrigue, and
corruption. These most deadly
adversaries of republican government might naturally have been expected to make their approaches from more than one quarter, but chiefly from the
desire in
foreign powers to gain an improper
ascendant in our councils. How could they better gratify this than by raising a creature of their
own to the chief
magistracy of the Union? But the
convention have guarded against all danger of this sort with the most provident and
judicious attention. They have not made the appointment of the
President to depend on any pre-existing bodies of men who might be tampered
with beforehand to
prostitute their votes; but they have refereed it in the first instance to an immediate act of the people of
America, to be
exerted in the choice of persons for the temporary and sole purpose of making the
appointment. And they have
excluded from
eligibility to
this trust all those who from situation might be suspected of too great devotion to the President in office. No senator, representative, or other
person holding a place of trust or profit under the
United States can be of the number of the electors. Thus without
corrupting the body of
the people, the immediate
agents in the election will at least enter upon the task free from any
sinister bias. Their
transient existence
and their detached situation, already taken notice of, afford a satisfactory prospect of their continuing so, to the conclusion of it. The
business of corruption, when it is to embrace so
considerable a number of men, requires
time as well as means. Nor would it be found easy
suddenly to embark them, dispersed as they would be over thirteen
States, in any combinations founded upon motives which, though they could not
properly be denominated corrupt, might yet be of a nature to mislead them from their duty.
Another and no less important
desideratum was that the executive should be independent for his continuance in office on all but the people
themselves. He might otherwise be tempted to
sacrifice his duty to his
complaisance for those whose favor was necessary to the duration of his
official consequence. This advantage will also be secured, by making his
re-election to depend on a special body of
representatives,
deputed by the society for the single purpose of making the important choice.
All these advantages will be happily combined in the plan devised by the
convention; which is, that the people of each
State shall choose a
number of persons as
electors, equal to the number of
senators and
representatives of such State in the national
government who shall
assemble within the State, and vote for some fit person as
President. Their votes, thus given, are to be transmitted to the seat of the
national
government, and the person who may happen to have a
majority of the whole number of votes might not always happen to center on one man, and as
it might be unsafe to permit less than a majority to be conclusive, it is provided that, in such a contingency, the
House of Representatives
shall elect out of the candidates who shall have the five highest number of votes the man who in their opinion may be best qualified for the
office.
This process of election provides a
moral certainty that
the office of President will seldom fall to the lot of any man who is not in an eminent
degree endowed with the requisite qualifications. Talents for low intrigue, and the little arts of popularity, may alone suffice to elevate a man
to the first
honors in a single
State; but it will require other talents, and a different kind of
merit, to establish him in the
esteem and
confidence of the whole
Union, or of so considerable a portion of it as would be necessary to make him a successful
candidate for the
distinguished
office of President of the United States. It will not be too strong to say that there will be a constant
probability of seeing
the station filled by characters
pre-eminent for
ability and
virtue. And this will be thought no
inconsiderable recommendation of the
Constitution by those who are able to estimate the share which the executive in every government must necessarily have in its good or ill
administration. Though we cannot
acquiesce in the political
heresy of the poet who says:
"For forms of government let fools contest--
That which is best administered is best,"--
yet we may safely
pronounce that the true test of a good
government is its aptitude and tendency to produce a good
administration.
The
Vice-President is to be chosen in the same manner with the
President; with this difference, that the
Senate is to do, in respect to the
former, what is to be done by the House of Repreentatives, in respect to the latter.
The appointment of an extraordinary person, as
Vice-President, has been objected to as
superfluous, if not
mischievous. It has been alleged
that it would have been
preferable to have authorized the
Senate to
elect out of their own body an officer answering to that description. But
two considerations seem to justify the ideas of the convention in this respect. One is that to secure at all times the possibility of a definitive
resolution of the body, it is necessary that the President should have only a casting
vote. And to take the senator of any State from his seat
as senator, to place him in that of
President of the
Senate, would be to exchange, in regard to the State from which he came, a constant for a
contingent vote. The other consideration is that as the
Vice-President may occasionally become a
substitute for the
President, in the
supreme executive
magistracy, all the reasons which recommend the mode of
election prescribed for the one apply with great if not with equal
force to the manner of appointing the other. It is remarkable that in this, as in most other instances, the objection which is made would lie
against the constitution of this State. We have a
Lieutenant-Governor, chosen by the people at large, who presides in the Senate, and is the
constitutional substitute for the
Governor, in casualties similar to those which would authorize the Vice-President to exercise the authorities
and discharge the duties of the
President.
-PUBLIS
Footnotes:
[1] -
Vide Federal Farmer
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