But although, in reality, I might not be able to conceive of a God without existence, no more than of a mountain without a valley, nevertheless, as from the simple fact that I conceive a mountain with a valley, it does not follow that there exists any mountain in the world, so likewise, although I conceive God as existent, it does not follow, it seems, from that, that God exists, for my thought does not impose any necessity on things; and as there is nothing to prevent my imagining a winged horse, although there is none which has wings, so I might, perhaps, be able to attribute existence to God, although there might not be any God which existed. So far from this being so, it is just here under the appearance of this objection that a sophism lies hid; for from the fact that I cannot conceive a mountain without a valley, it does not follow that there exists in the world any mountain or any valley, but solely that the mountain and the valley, whether they exist or not, are inseparable from one another; whereas from the fact alone that I cannot conceive God except as existent, it follows that existence is inseparable from him, and, consequently, that he exists in reality; not that my thought can make it to be so, or that it can impose any necessity upon things; but on the contrary the necessity which is in the thing itself, that is to say, the necessity of the existence of God, determines me to have this thought.
For it is not at my will to conceive of a God without existence, that is to say, a being supremely perfect without a supreme perfection, as it is at my will to conceive a horse with wings or without wings.
And it must not also be said here that it is necessarily true that I should affirm that God exists, after I have supposed him to possess all kinds of perfection, since existence is one of these, but that my first supposition is not necessary, no more than it is necessary to affirm that all figures of four sides may be inscribed in the circle, but that, supposing I had this thought, I should be constrained to admit that the rhombus can be inscribed there, since it is a figure of four sides, and thus I should be constrained to admit something false. One ought not, I say, to allege this; for although it may not be necessary that I should ever fall to thinking about God, nevertheless, when it happens that I think upon a being first and supreme, and draw, so to speak, the idea of him from the store-house of mind, it is necessary that I attribute to him every sort of perfection, although I may not go on to enumerate them all, and give attention to each one in particular. And this necessity is sufficient to bring it about (as soon as I recognise that I should next conclude that existence is a perfection) that this first and supreme being exists: while, just as it is not necessary that I ever imagine a triangle, but whenever I choose to consider a rectilinear figure, composed solely of three angles, it is absolutely necessary that I attribute to it all the things which serve for the conclusion that there three angles are not greater than two right angles, although, perhaps, I did not then consider this in particular.
Descartes' Proof for the Existence of God, defined in Meditation III in his "Discourse on the Method," is one of the most studied of all of his ideas. It is more respected than the proof offered by Anselm in his "Proslogion," since Descartes removes the premise of "I believe in God," isolating theological nature from his argument.
Descartes began his meditations with four procedural rules:
In short, Descartes states his cogito, that when he thinks, he has ideas, and he has an idea of God which he did not cause - The idea is an effect. He says his idea of God is of a perfect being, and that perfection entails existence. He finally states that a cause must possess as much reality as its effect, and the cause of his idea of God is not himself, since he is imperfect. Therefore, reasons Descartes, God exists.
It is a worthy argument, and when you assume all of the premises are valid, the conclusion must be true. This is why this is indeed a compelling argument that could convince your non-believer of average intelligence. However, it fails to impress me.
Descartes' first two premises are valid. There's no reason to discuss them then. Where Descartes' argument falls short is on his third premise. His idea of God existed previous to him sealing himself off and performing the meditations that led him to this proof. Even if he truly was able to get rid of all ideas obtained prior to the meditation, the fact remains he was still thinking in human language - Something which, by adolescence, would have become nearly hard-wired into his brain's language and thought centers.
In that language there were words - one of which was "God." Had he successfully forgotten everything he had learned, he would have no idea of the word "God," let alone of the concept of him. His bias in this area shows through.
Further, he states that his idea of God is an effect, which obviously, must have a cause. He rationalizes that this cause is God's very existence. I put forth that the cause was the information gene of religion being implanted in his brain. This information gene, or meme, gained enough of a prominence to remain even after he had "forgotten" everything else that he obtained through his senses, and thus, its existence and prominence led him to create this proof.
This peg knocked out, one no longer needs to spend time finding flaws in his fourth, fifth, and sixth premises, because the seventh immediately becomes an invalid one. With at least two flawed premises, the conclusion is no longer true. So it is my opinion, that, when interpreted sans analysis, the proof appears to be readily valid. But like a coin fresh off the mint which has the appearance of perfection, it doesn't look the slightest bit perfect when examined with an electron microscope. The magnification of intellectual analysis will find the weaknesses in any argument that appears true on the surface.
In his Meditations on First Philosophy, Rene Descartes outlined two proofs for the existence of God - one in Meditation III and a second in the fifth meditation. Proof of the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient and all good deity (Descartes' concept of `God' being firmly rooted in the Christian tradition) is necessary, according to Descartes, for the meditator to proceed from the state of Cartesian doubt into reliable knowledge of the external world. The claims Descartes lays in order to make this step are the `trademark' argument and the ontological argument, the latter of which shall concern this investigation. It is necessary to discuss this argument and its refutations in order to critically examine its validity.
The ontological argument is an a priori argument in that it does not rely on experience to prove its point - that God exists. Descartes professes this argument in Meditation V as such:
"When I concentrate, it is quite evident that existence can no more be separated from the essence of God than the ... idea of a mountain can be separated from the idea of a valley... Hence it is just as much of a contradiction to think of God (that is, a supremely perfect being) lacking existence (that is, lacking a perfection) as it is to think of a mountain without a valley."
The first and most cited criticism of Descartes' ontological proposition is that the idea of `existence' is not a property as such can be applied to something as could colour or shape or strength: it is not a predicate. Kant illustrates this with a comparison between the ideas that "God is merciful" and "God is existent". These two sentences are not of the same logical form: existence or non-existence does not change the essence of God, whereas to negate "God is merciful" would alter the concept of God itself. Hirst summarises this as follows - "The God who exists does not have an extra quality as against a God who does not exist: in idea he is exactly the same." This refutation is in turn countered by Malcolm, who argues that it makes no sense to speculate on an eternal being ceasing to exist, as comparisons of God to finite things are just irrelevant. Malcolm stresses Descartes' point (what he made in the replies to the objections to the Mediations) of the necessary existence of God - God is a unique case and for God existence is a property - which frees the ontological concept of internal contradiction as highlighted by Kant. In Descartes' own words:
"...In the case of God necessary existence is in fact a property in the strictest sense of the term, since it applies to him alone and forms part of his essence as it does no other thing."
"Neither in God nor in anything else is existence a perfection, but rather without that there are no perfections... Existence cannot be said to exist in a thing like perfection; and if a thing lacks existence, then it is not just imperfect, it is nothing at all."
A second criticism of the ontological argument is that which demonstrates the absurdity of the consequences of applying the argument to other forms than God. Were the ontological argument valid, the perfect desert island, boyfriend, society and so on could all be defined into existence. This is, quite obviously, not the case! It may well be possible to define the concept of a perfect desert island, but not possible to just make it exist. To defend the ontological argument against this sort or criticism, it could be argued that the perfect island, boyfriend or society are only perfect examples of different types of things, and, again, a supremely perfect deity does not fall into the same category, as the deity has, and is, all perfections, so is a "special case".
A further development of the idea "If God exists, then he exists" is the idea that nothing that is perfect might exist. Descartes states theories about triangles - "...its three angles equal two right angles" in abstraction as to whether anything triangular exists or not. Similarly, it can be argued, he presents theories about God in abstraction from whether God exists or not. This idea was put forth by Hume - that something can be thought of as existing, but that has no bearing on the thing's actual existence. Take for example the existence of $100: the can be thought of as existing, yet that holds no bearing on whether it exists immediately. Even if in spite of the other refutations existence is accepted as a component of perfection, this is perfectly compatible with nothing perfect existing, as Kenny concludes "...If nothing is perfect then nothing is divine, and there is no God, and so Descartes' proof fails."
To prove God's existence is a necessary stage for Descartes in the Meditations. Unfortunately, as shown by the refutations of Descartes' proposition in the fifth meditation, the ontological `proof' is not sound. It can be countered as the idea of existence being a perfection is questionable, also that if the ontological argument was sound, it would allow all sorts of things to be defined into existence, which are, quite frankly, impossible. Furthermore, a perfect thing might not even exist, so God may have every perfection, but still may not exist. However, it should be considered that the ontological argument is one of two such proofs in the Meditations, therefore (unlike St. Anselm!) Descartes did not design this as an independent, self contained proof of God's existence, so perhaps it should not be judged as such. Although the ontological argument does not prove the existence of God, neither do the refutations prove his non-existence. In this way it can be said, as Hirst argues, that the ontological argument shows only that the question of God's existence cannot be settled by conceptual thoughts of God.
Coming soon... The Trademark Argument!
Sources: http://plato.stanford.edu Beck, L. The Metaphysics of Descartes Oxford University Press (1965, 1967) Oxford Descartes, R. (Translated by Anscombe, E.) Philosophical Writings Nelson (1954) London Descartes, R. (Translated by Cottingham, J.) Objections and Replies to the Meditations Cambridge University Press, (1986, 1987) Cambridge Gale, R. On the Nature and Existence of God Cambridge University Press (1991) Cambridge Hanfling, O. Fundamental Problems in Philosophy Open University Press (1972) Bristol Hirst, R. Philosophy Routledge (1968) London Houston, J. Is it reasonable to believe in God? Handsel Press (1984) Edinburgh Jaspers, K. (Translated by Manheim, R.) Leonardo, Descartes, Max Weber Routledge (1937, 1964)London Kenny, A. A Brief History of Western Philosophy Blackwell (1998) London Magee, B. The Great Philosophers BBC Books (1987) London Miller, B. From Existence to God Routledge (1992) London
In his Meditations on First Philosophy, René Descartes introduces two separate proofs for the existence of a supremely powerful and perfect God. The first, presented in the third meditation, is an existential or causal proof: it is predicated on the existence of the idea of God, thence proceeding to his actual existence via the logical process established through the first two meditations. Conversely, Descartes' second argument, from the fifth meditation, relies on God's essence to prove his existence: "that God has all perfections and that existence is one of these perfections" is enough to prove his reality (Meditations, 67). Though the two reach the same conclusion -- that God as Descartes conceives of him must by necessity exist -- they arrive at it from nearly opposite directions.
Descartes begins his first argument for God's existence with the same procedure of systematic and sustained doubt that characterises the whole of the Meditations. His aim is to break down every assumption into its simplest form, moving from the least complicated ideas through to increasingly more complex ones, eventuating in a conclusion; this ensures that his arguments are built to withstand criticism, on solid foundations built up from scratch instead of on shaky assumptions that might be prone to error. Descartes' argument thus begins by establishing his cogito, the most basic certainty that he himself is extant and "a thinking thing" (35).
For Descartes, it follows that thinking allows for entertaining ideas; but in keeping with his system of methodical doubt, there are a number of proscriptions that make clear what can fairly be defined as an idea. Of all the thoughts that one can think, "[s]ome [...] are like images of things; to these alone does the word 'idea' properly apply, as when I think of a man, or a chimera, or the sky, or an angel, or God" (37). Of course, some things that can be thought are subjective and therefore more likely to be error-ridden, because of the fallibility of the senses and interpretive mistakes -- these Descartes calls "judgements" and discards, along with ideas which erroneously "represent a non-thing as if it were a thing" (43). Eventually there is nothing left to think of, except for the idea of God -- for to think of things outside oneself that are imperfect is to risk drawing incorrect conclusions, not to mention that "it seems entirely possible that [things outside of the thinker] are contained in [the thinker] eminently" and do not exist outside thoughts at all (45).
That God is an idea that can be thought is the crux on which the entire argument rests -- for once God has been thought, where "God" is defined as "a certain substance that is infinite, independent, supremely intelligent and supremely powerful, and that created [...] everything [...] that exists", he "must necessarily exist" since perfection has to entail existence (45). To support this claim, Descartes adds that the very idea of God must have come from God himself, because human beings are incapable of thinking something that is so far beyond their own capacity without help: "the idea of God which is in us must have God himself as its cause" (15).
This conclusion is remarkably similar to that drawn by St. Anselm in his ontological argument from the Proslogion. But Descartes' version seems more credible because there are no theological underpinnings holding it together; by making his prerequisite belief in himself rather than belief in God and appealing to logic rather than to the religious beliefs of his readers, Descartes certainly succeeded in creating a convincing argument. All that is necessary to ensure its success is that its readers have experienced these sorts of thoughts about perfection and God, because then Descartes' logic seems almost intuitive.
Assuaging his own doubts about "whether anything certain is to be had concerning material things" is the reason that Descartes gives for beginning his fifth meditation, but his musings quickly segue into another method of proving that God exists. This time, though, the argument is based on the essence of God rather than his existence (although the two are later proven to be inextricably linked); this is why it is called the "essential argument", to differentiate it from the first ("existential") proof.
Descartes' opening shot is the image of a triangle. The mathematical principles of geometry as they relate to the triangle are immutable: for instance, the fact that the sum of its three angles is equal to the sum of two right angles holds true for any triangle, real or imagined (64). It doesn't matter whether or not Descartes, or any thinker for that matter, has actually measured the angles and ascertained that they add up as they are supposed to. Properties like this, even though they require no actual experience to be known, are real and irrefutable. "[T]hey are something and not merely nothing" (65).
If something like mathematics can be known without having been experienced -- as Descartes puts it, that if he is able to think of "the idea of something", and if "it follows that all that [he] clearly and distinctly [perceives] to belong to that thing really does belong to it", perhaps God can be known in the same way. The sticking point is that in God's case, the property that must be thought is existence itself. For Descartes, the answer is obvious:
[E]xistence can no more be separated from God's essence than its having three angles equal to two right angles can be separated from the essence of a triangle, or than that the idea of a valley can be separated from the idea of a mountain. Thus it is no less contradictory to think of God (that is, a supremely perfect being) lacking existence (that is, lacking some perfection) than it is to think of a mountain without a valley. (66)
What Descartes is trying to prove is that "God has all perfections and that existence is one of these perfections" (67) -- so if God did not exist he would not be perfect, and thus by definition his non-existence is not possible, just as by definition the measures of the three angles of a triangle add up to the sum of two right angles. Just as in pure mathematics, one need not make the measurements for oneself in order to know that the postulate is true.
This is the most critical difference between the first and second arguments for the existence of God. Where the former demands a certain measure of experience, the latter releases its adherents from that responsibility and instead asks only for understanding of the idea that "existence is inseparable from God, and for that reason he really exists" (67). A second important difference is that the first argument relies on finding the means for believing in God within oneself -- specifically in becoming self-conscious enough to realise that a thought of such true perfection must have originated outside one's imperfect self -- while the second relates God to material things, with characteristics and attributes that are analogous to things that can be perceived in the real world. This last is not the same as experience, however; though the objects that appear in Descartes' analogies (geometrical forms, mountains and valleys) can be perceived in the physical world, they need not be in order to be understood.
Of course, neither argument is entirely free from flaws -- one might criticise the second argument for classifying existence as an attribute like colour or texture, for example, and they are clearly nowhere near the same: whether God is red or blue has no bearing on his omnipotence, but take away his existence and he is nothing at all. The fact that Descartes presents two proofs, attacking the problem from different angles, instead of a single one might be viewed as a measure to keep such criticisms from refuting his account entirely in one fell swoop. At the very least they demonstrate that Descartes did not intend for either of his arguments to be complete in and of itself, a self-contained definitive argument for God's existence. But maybe most importantly, the way the proofs differ demonstrates a shift in Descartes' understanding of the physical world as the Meditations progress. As the first proof begins, nothing can be dead certain except self-knowledge; and even if absolutely nothing about the external world can be known for sure, the idea of God can be found within oneself. The second proof is the converse -- even where self-knowledge fails, God can be found in outside things like mathematics. In this light, whether or not they're correct is a secondary concern: the proofs are just one aspect of Descartes' quest for true knowledge, and both are necessary to reflect his evolving certainties about the physical world and his place in it.
Descartes, René. Meditations on First Philosophy, 3rd ed., trans. Donald A. Cress. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1993.
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