On 23 April 1949, the process of cost-cutting and
military unification led
Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson to halt construction of the
Navy's new supercarrier, the USS United States. This prompted much protest from
Navy officials, but
Johnson defended his action, saying that the USS United States was a platform for strategic
bombing, a function he felt was adequately served by
Air Force B-36 bombers. Also, due to a lack of nuclear weapons, the development of a carrier which could deploy nuclear-equipped
aircraft was not financially feasible. The cesation of
construction implied the end of Navy
aviation. Implications aside, it was an outright
modification of the Navy's plans for future
defense development without their consultation. Secretary of the Navy, John Sullivan, immediately gave president
Harry S. Truman his resignation.
Shortly after, an
anonymous document was made public and eventually presented to the Armed Services Committee which stated that
Louis A. Johnson, as well as the Secretary of the
Air Force would gain personally through the procurement of more B-36 bombers and that had been their
motivation for the decision to halt construction on the
ship. The document was soon found to have been written by Cedric Worth, a
civilian assistant to the under-secretary of the
Navy (and interestingly, a former
Hollywood script writer). Unfortunately for the
Navy, this document was also found to be completely
false.
Despite this, angry letters sent by three Naval Admirals resulted in hearings before the Congressional Armed Services Committee. Their complaint was against the de-emphasis of naval aviation. Prominent
Navy officials presented their arguments to the commitee in person or through written statements from October 13 through 15,
1949. Omar Bradly, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, accused these men of "open
rebellion" for their
dissent.
Eventually the committee sided with neither the
Air Force or the Navy. In the Committee Report released on March 1,
1950, they concluded that they were not qualified to evaluate the effectiveness of the B-36 bomber. They did, however, question the qualifications of
Louis A. Johnson to make decisions regarding the development of Navy vessels and decided that the
government should accept the advice of leaders of each service regarding it's weapons.
Unfortunately, this was all a result (in my opinion) of misunderstandings between the
Air Force and the
Navy. The
Air Force viewed the
Navy's development of air power as
competition whereas the
Navy only wanted to enhance their sea power through the use of
sea-based aircraft. It was also the result of a poor decision on the part of
Louis A. Johnson. Although an
ammendment to the
National Security Act gave him the
authority to make such decisions, he did so only under the advisement of
Army and
Air Force officals, and without consulting the
Navy; a decision which ultimately led to his early resignation from the office of the
Secretary of Defense at the request of
Harry S. Truman.
references: http://internationaldefense.com, www.defenselink.mil, http://www.afa.org/, www.navy.mil