Perhaps it has also come to your notice that the rules for killing need a little attention? They represent a motley assemblage of contrary guidelines and vaguely adhered to strictures unparalleled in their ambiguity. The following analysis is an attempt to summarize some of the more frequently encountered rules; it will no doubt illustrate some of the more ambiguous, and problematic of the rules for killing. It should be noted that while some would not include the act of eating (without concomitant slaughter of the eaten by the eater) as an exemplar of killing, I will be including it here, as it aids in identifying some of the problems present in the current rule set. I will also be including the acceptance of, or reaction to killing as a concept important to the rules.

The most important species distinction that we make is the one that differentiates us (humans) from everything else that both lives and moves (animals). For reasons of clarity, plant life is excluded. Generally, killing is more acceptable when the object of the drive to extinguish falls within the animal category. Oh, there are exceptions....many, many exceptions as we shall see; so while this is a useful general rule, it requires much assistance from the other rules in order to be applied correctly. It has precedents in many religious texts, and is no doubt useful also from a species preservation perspective; many animals follow the same principle, naturally with their own species replacing the human 'non-viable target' category.

It is more acceptable to kill if the object is of a particular configuration that renders it favourable to the palate (excluding humans in all but niche markets). A related dictum involves the ease of killing, and the ability of the object to resist and cause harm if threatened. This rule obviously has roots in the biological necessity principle: eat or die ... but it has come some way since then. Complex patterns of relationship between humans and animals have emerged as a direct result of this rule set, such as the domestication for consumption purposes of various 'common' animals such as the chicken, cow and pig. In the modern context, this rule is so confounded with several of the other rules (3,5,6) that it has become almost unrecognisable from it's original form.

Some living objects have become through dint of scarcity, aesthetic value, romantic association or environmental value, less viable targets of annihilation. Those species designated as endangered (in terms of species, not individual, survival) are the obvious exemplars of this rule (eg pandas, various large birds, whales, big cats). Other species, though not endangered, have become important romantic icons (eg dolphins, humans). However, this rule is not without problems, particularly with respect to endangered species. By the very virtue of their scarcity, some species become more viable targets for particular segments of human life. Rare life may be considered useful for animistic magical purposes (eg rhinoceros horn, tiger penis), or merely as difficult to procure decoration (various pelts, teeth and tusks). Furthermore, romantic association may not directly protect a species from harm from those who most come in contact with them, as various competitive or accidental death issues then come into play (dolphins - tuna - fishermen : kangaroos/dingos - sheep/cows/grass/crops - graziers/farmers – families, see rule 6). It could be hypothesized that those animals that have been extensively anthropormorphized in film, books and song might be protected by a degree of romantic association; however, rabbits, cows, mice, horses, pigs, various birds (chickens, ducks, geese), and a large number of insect species stand out as species both heavily 'humanized' and frequently expunged. Furthermore, advertising quislings attest to the frightening reverse effect of anthropormophic romanticization, where cartoon versions of cows and chickens in particular seem all too ready to sell the dead carcasses of their kith and kin for purposes of consumption; with we humans quite willing chow down as a result.

In general, being small may make it easier to hide, but the cold eye of expungement tends to just look that much harder. Insects and the like are obvious targets for termination, the likely motives being based on sanitary, aesthetic, fear, amusement or irritation factors. Mammals are not immune, particularly mice and rats. However, larger species are far less likely to be killed for the same motives. Large animals encroaching on human communities (fear and irritation factors) are often relocated. Examples: bears, crocodiles, alligators. Larger life forms may be generally viewed as more significant (perhaps some influence of the romanticized, rule 3), more alive, or more worthy of continued life. Obvious confoundings can be seen (rule 2 large domesticated species, rule 3 small endangered). When applied to humans, this rule is generally inverted (the killing of young hence small humans is less acceptable than the killing of older hence large humans. This is obviously related to rule 3 (romanticized). Obviously, there are contradictions, as size effects do not appear to protect unborn humans in many cases.

This blanket rule applies to all species. When applied to humans, killing is both easier and more acceptable as distance increases. The decision to terminate a life is much less difficult to make if the object cannot be seen (artillery, guided missiles), and if the object is not yet present (timed explosive devices). There is obviously an influence of risk avoidance present in this rule. Moreover, this distance may also be expressed as a distance of identification (for example identification of similarity between types of humans). Humans of particular sub-categories tend to react more positively to the killing of other sub-categories than their own. As applied to animal species, this rule is easily demonstrated by an excursion to any market or grocery store, where humans by proxy kill impressive numbers of various animal species at a comfortable distance. The rule is further supported by the expressed unwillingness of most to kill these same species, for the same purposes, via direct interaction. Obvious contradictions exist (eg rule 3, romanticized, endangered), as some humans strongly reject the termination of species members quite remote from themselves, and furthermore, many of these same humans continue to apply rule 4, killing small proximal life forms, with extreme vigilance.

When applied to animal species, this rule relates quite strongly to rule 2, as evidenced by the routine termination of various common (domesticated) animals. However, it contradicts rule 3 (romanticized) as various species designated as pets are quite unacceptable targets (unless considering the unwanted progeny of same, or pet species without owners). When applied to humans this is one of the most problematic rules, conflicting strongly with rules 3 (romanticized) and 5 (distance). A majority of humans are more likely to kill a human who they interact with on a regular basis, than another with whom they have only casual or one-off interactions. The motives giving rise to this manifestation of the rule are the subject of intense and ongoing scrutiny. It can be argued from a purely statistical standpoint that extended interaction with a particular human merely increases the chances that any episode of life termination will involve that individual. However, it can also be argued that the sheer number of humans with which fleeting interactions are experienced outweighs this effect. In many cases it appears that a human life falling under the fragile protection of the romanticized (rule 3) category, may become more acceptable than baseline levels as targets if they are removed, or remove themselves from the category.

There is an inverse relationship between intelligence (a definition we will not be considering in the depth that it deserves) and the suitability of a species as a target (eg. dolphins or primates versus cows or chickens). There are obvious elements of rule 3 (romanticized) in this rule, and the very rough correlation between size and intelligence perhaps provides some rationale for rule 4 (size). However, there are contradictions generated by rules 5 (distance), 2 (tasty), 6 (familiarity) when considering such domesticated animals as pigs (since they are generally more intelligent than dogs). When applied to humans this rule is inherently ambiguous: greater intelligence may serve to either protect or endanger depending on a variety of conditions. A positive relationship can be seen when considering humans of various ages (such that children are both less intelligent and less acceptable targets), though this is likely to be an extraneous correlation, explained more aptly by other rules.

Killing for many humans is a recreational pastime. The effects of all other rules can be seen in the end form of this rule, in manners too numerous to mention in entirety. The majority of rule applications involve animal species, of a non-endangered, small to medium size, on many occasions for the secondary purpose of consumption, but often for the animistic magical properties of animal remains (trophies), or the satisfaction of a drive to kill. However, this rule is also often applied to humans (perhaps for some of the same reasons). To some, other humans are just like chickens.