A Categorical Imperative is considered by Kant to be a maxim that would be followed by any rational being. There is no "if" involved, they simply are ends in themselves. These imperatives should be followed simply because they are duties. They are a reason for action.

The best known of the Categorical Imperatives are three included in the summary of Kant's Groundwork. H. J. Paton translates them as follows (the comments are my own) -

1. Act as if the maxim of your action was to become through your will a Universal law of nature.

This is known as The Formula of the Law of Nature. It is basically saying that we should attempt to eliminate all self-interest from our action. It is somewhat utilitarian because it is saying we should base our actions on what will benefit the majority of people the most.

2. Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.

This is The Formula of the End In Itself. Kant is stating in this that it is never right to treat a human being as simply a means of working towards some end, but always an end in themselves. Kant described humans as "holy" because of this. It can never be right, therefore, to use any group of people for your goals, or to categorise any group as a minority that doesn't matter. This principle upholds the ideal of no discrimination based on creed, gender or age.

3. So act as if you were through your maxims a law-making member of a Kingdom of ends.

This is The Formula of the Kingdom of Ends. Kant imagined that rational agents working to solve problems would all reach at similar rational decisions, so in-effect any rational agent was making a law that would be agreed upon by all. Any disagreement could be solved by rational debate.

Immanuel Kant devised a system of morals based on reason alone, without regard to the empirical world. Using a tool, a system of moral determinism that he called the Categorical Imperative, Kant claimed to be able to negotiate the labyrinth of morality and action using an analytical and reasonable approach. The benefits of this approach are quite numerous, for using this approach anyone would, theoretically, be able to reach the same conclusions again and again regardless of religious, educational, or social background. Kant attempted to elevate the philosophy of morals above that of intuition; in the Categorical Imperative, Kant hoped, lay the path to a scientific approach to the philosophy of morality. However, there are some severe fundamental flaws in Kant's approach, and, ironically, in his reasoning. The Categorical Imperative can actually be used to determine the immorality of the Imperative itself. Kant's approach to the issue of morality is not only elitist, but also irresponsible.

Kant has long been accused of being elitist, usually because of his choice of language. Kant tended to invent words and phrases in order to adequately explain his theories and ideas, but in doing so, sometimes caused the alienation of his peers. While his language was ultimately understandable and worthwhile to those who chose to spend the time to master it, it was viewed as dangerous, because it separated the philosophy of morality from those who need to understand it the most: the common person. This, however, is only half correct. Kant is most definitely elitist, and his theories definitely alienate the common person, but for a much deeper and more significant reason that his choice of language.

In order to understand why Kant failed to adequately provide a system of morals, it is important to understand what Kant was attempting to do in the first place. For much of history, morality was determined through two different but similar ways. The first was through education: a child would be taught the lessons of morality by his parents, or by his church, or by the educational institutions of the state. The second method of moral education came through an empirical basis: as a child went through life, he would make discoveries and determine which actions tended to produce the more desirable results. Both of these methods are related by the empirical approach, both being based upon past knowledge of what creates the more desirable results. What Kant hypothesized, and indeed came close to successfully arguing, was that morals should not be based on empirical evidence but on reason alone. In one of the most fundamental passages in Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant draws a distinction between acting in accord with duty, and acting from duty.

"To be beneficent where one can is a duty...but I maintain that in such a case an action of this kind, however dutiful and amiable it may be, has nevertheless no true moral worth...deserves praise and encouragement but not esteem; for its maxim lacks the moral content of an action done not from inclination but from duty." (Kant, 11)

Kant thus differentiates from he who has memorized the actions that morals demand, and he who can determine the morality of an action in and of itself, by using the Categorical Imperative. This is an important distinction, for it demands a person not only act the way he has been taught, but to be able to reason and determine that certain actions have genuine worth, and thus deserve esteem. When one uses the Categorical Imperative, says Kant, they can truly act from duty.

It is here that Kant alienates a large section of the populace. The Categorical Imperative is a tool that demands the user to "act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law." In this way, one can determine, through reason, which action is morally responsible. In the text Metaphysics of Morals, Kant offers four "duties" that illustrate, by willing that a maxim should become a universal law, how the Categorical Imperative can be used to determine the moral worth of an action. These four "duties" present how reason, and only reason, should be used when determining the moral worth of an action. However, the severe limitation of the Categorical Imperative is that it presupposes a populace's ability to reason; if the Categorical Imperative is the only route to true morality, then a person who takes an action in accord with the Imperative's conclusions, but does not utilize the Imperative, is not acting from duty. The logical extension is that such a person is, if not immoral, at least amoral. This is a dangerous path for Kant to follow.

Suppose a person is born without the ability to reason. If reason is to be a scientific process, surely there are some people who purely will not be able to reach the same level of scientific conclusion. Perhaps a personality trait, or a lack of intelligence, causes such a person to be unable to reason to the extent that the Categorical Imperative demands. Perhaps this person is a child, or is developmentally challenged. Kant would then say that, because such a person is unable to reason, their actions can have no moral worth, and thus that person will never have the ability of living a moral life. Perhaps this person, who up until now has been living under the moral code of their parents or their church, discovers that they cannot be moral. While Kant does claim that acting in accord with duty is at least "admirable" and at least "deserves praise and encouragement", this person's actions are nonetheless not truly moral.

Kant thus runs the risk of alienating a populace that cannot reason to his extent. Once one reaches the conclusion that they are amoral, that is, acting without morals, and that they cannot do anything to change this fact, it is quite possible that they will stop following any moral code at all. A person without moral duty is a very dangerous person, in that there is no reason for them not to act against morality as often as they do in accord with it.

The irony of this situation is that, because of such reasoning, the Categorical Imperative fails its own "Formula of Universal Law". Suppose Kant were to attempt to follow his own Imperative, and that was his maxim, and as such he willed that it became universal law that all should have as their maxim "one should use the Categorical Imperative to determine the moral worth of an action." If it were to become universal, then the above-mentioned hypothetical situation would occur, and people who could not reason would not be capable of performing actions with moral worth. They would then have no reason not to perform immoral actions, especially since the person cannot even reason that the actions are immoral. Kant's own attempt at creating a "Kingdom of Ends]" actually creates a world in which people no longer even try to act moral. Since no philosopher could will that their own moral theory cause a breakdown in the systems of morality, Kant cannot will his Categorical Imperative into Universal Law.

Kant attempted to elevate morality to that of science, but in doing so forgot that morals are a tool for people to use. If people are to be told that they have no hope of ever becoming moral, that they will not be able to even use the tool, then the whole concept of morality is futile. Kant's presupposition that all people can reason is not a responsible conclusion, but rather is the conclusion of an elitist who felt that morals were only to be available to those who had the privilege of higher thought. While honourable, Kant's theories are nonetheless dangerous and, ultimately, irrational.

Works Cited

Kant, Immanual. Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals. Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hacket Publishing Company Inc, 1993.

Hoopy Frood. "Immanuel Kant." Online Posting. 25. March. 2000

Immanuel Kant's ethical theory is based around his idea of a Categorical Imperative. That is, moral rules (imperatives) that man must apply in every case (categorical).
He saw the Categorical Imperative as being opposed to a hypothetical imperative. A Hypothetical Imperative is something that tells you what you ought to do if you want to achieve something in the short run. A Categorical Imperative is something which just simply ought to be done. There is no goal in it, it is, according to Kant, the one moral rule to follow.

Kant believed morality had nothing to do with consequences. Rather, it is about the means, and the only moral act, according to Kant, was one performed out of a sense of duty and purely out of a sense of duty. If there was any end in an act for somebody, even if it is the warm feeling one gets after knowing one has done something good for somebody- to Kant, the only moral act was one done with no end in sight for the person performing the act.
Had Kant been alive long enough to know of Utilitarianism, he would have written so much against it, because utilitarianism bases morality totally on consequences, specifically, 'the greatest happiness for the greatest number'.

The Categorical Imperative is the rule, says Kant, all other moral rules boil down to (if they truly are moral rules). Kant expressed this rule in two major ways, the First and Second formation. The first formation was the Principle of Universalisability and the second formation was Kant's principle of treating people as ends in themselves and not purely as means. Firstly, he had the rule of Universalisability. That is, in his own words (but, obviously, translated into the English of his day), 'act only upon that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become an universal law'. This would seem fairly obvious to most people.
Put in simpler words, it means no man is special, therefore no man has the right to, say, lie. If one man lied, there'd be maybe some people slightly worse off than before, and it would be harder to trust this one man in future, and communication between the man who lied and the person who listened. But applied to the principle of Universalisability, everybody lying would break the whole of society down. Society is based on communication, hence if communication breaks down, society breaks down, and there would be chaos.

Or take the case of one man committing murder. In the case where it's just the one man, there is a single tragedy but on a world scale it comes to next to nothing of a tragedy. Applied to the principle of Universalisability, if everybody killed everybody, who would remain on the Planet?

Kant's second formation of the Categorical Imperative was, in his words but, again, translated into the English of his time, 'so act as to treat Humanity, in thine own person or that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as a means only'. This also seems obvious. Put simply, it means to treat people only as means to you end is immoral. People are people and deserve to be treated as ends in themselves. This is not to say Kant didn't agree with people being used as means to somebody's end as well as an end in themselves. What this means is not to treat people 'as a means only'.

So take the example of a fishmonger. He is needed by the people so they may have their fish. Nobody is treating the fishmonger purely as a means to their end of fish. The fishmonger is a human being, an end in himself, but he is needed so the people may eat fish.
But then take the example of, the capitalist exploitation of the working class, the proletariat. The wealthy upper class treat the working class purely as means to their end, their monies. Kant would find this highly immoral, had he lived to see capitalism. Indeed, as would, and do, most people around the world today.

The crux of the Kantian moral system is that there exists within each rational being a categorical imperative, to be followed if one wishes to act in accordance with the moral law. It is 'categorical' because it is unconditional, universally applicable; it is an 'imperative' because it is necessary that we follow it. (There is another kind of imperative, the 'hypothetical imperative'—it involves keeping in mind the consequences of one's actions and using those actions as a means toward that end.) In effect, it consists of asking oneself "whether I can also will that my maxim [i.e., that notion according to which any given action of mine is determined] should become a universal law. If not, then the maxim must be rejected, not because of any disadvantage accruing to me or even to others, but because it cannot be fitting as a principle in a possible legislation of universal law" (Kant, 15). The categorical imperative is also an a priori construction—that is, it doesn't require that we have any worldly experience to back it up, because it is derived from reason alone; rather than beginning with what we can experience and drawing a conclusion from there, Kant begins with reason and from there applies the conclusion he reaches to experience. This may at first seem like a backward formation, but beginning on a priori grounds ensures that the imperative is universal—for any conclusion drawn a posteriori must necessarily be contingent, as its origins are contingent. (The a priori and a posteriori are more or less necessity and contingency in logic, respectively.)

On the formation of a categorical moral imperative and its necessarily being a priori, Kant writes:

[U]nless we want to deny to the concept of morality all truth and all reference to a possible object, we cannot but admit that the moral law is of such widespread significance that it must hold not merely for men but for all rational beings generally, and that it must be valid not merely under contingent conditions and with exceptions but must be absolutely necessary. Clearly, therefore, no experience can give occasion for inferring even the possibility of such apodictic laws. (20)

That is, the categorical imperative applies not only to human beings but also to rational beings in general—for since it is derived from reason, any rational being ought to be able to derive it (and since it by definition is something that must be followed, being able to derive it necessarily means being able to follow it, too). And for the same reason, this is also an argument against even the possibility of moral imperatives being drawn from a posteriori grounds—for if the imperative is to apply to all rational beings, who are we as human beings to surmise what the experiences of any other rational beings might be, or even that ours correspond to theirs? This contingency makes for shaky ground, and so the categorical imperative must be firmly and exclusively a priori.

Rejecting a maxim if it fails to meet the criterion of applicability on a universal level is an affirmation that it is unsuitable to be "a principle in a possible legislation of universal law" because acting in accordance with it is inherently self-contradictory. (Thus checking to see if in acting according to a maxim I contradict myself is a different way to determine the maxim's universal applicability, in reverse.) For instance, the maxim "Do not tell the truth" is predicated on the notion that there are certain truths that we might tell. Consciously being guided by this maxim by telling lies instead of truth affirms that there is truth that might be told instead at the same time as it acts in the opposite way—that is, while lying I have in mind that I could be telling the truth, and then I don't do it. Whether the consequences are good or bad and whether the action, under a given set of circumstance, is for good or for ill, the fact remains that it isn't possible to act according that maxim without contradicting myself—it doesn't stand up to scrutiny and therefore goes against the categorical imperative solely on the basis of reason. (This is unsurprising in a moral system that itself is entirely rational.) Naturally there are some immoral actions that are not internally self-contradictory, "but there is still no possibility of willing that their maxims should be raised to the universality of a law of nature, because such a will would contradict itself" even though the action does not (32).

Kant outlines a number of different formations of the categorical imperative; they begin from disparate places and are phrased in various ways, but all of them are equivalent. Broadly speaking, they all fall under the following definition:

[T]here is one kind of imperative which immediately commands a certain conduct without having as its condition any other purpose to be attained by it. This imperative is categorical. It is not concerned with the matter of the action and its intended result, but rather with the form of the action and the principle from which it follows; what is essentially good in the action consists in the mental disposition, let the consequences be what they may. This imperative may be called that of morality. (26)

The first formation deals with universal law, as above: it says that as a moral being, you are to "[a]ct only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law" (30). This is the most basic, canonical formation of the categorical imperative, and has already been elaborated upon above. But another aspect of it that has not been heretofore detailed is that it can also be applied to duty (although Kant grants that "there is left undecided whether what is called duty may not be an empty concept"): "the universal imperative of duty [is to] [a]ct as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a universal law of nature" (30). This is not so much a new concept in itself as it is a means of applying the categorical imperative. Our duty is to act according to it; and thus, if we transgress duty, "we find that we actually do not will that our maxim should become a universal law—because this is impossible for us—but rather that the opposite of this maxim should remain a law universally" (32). This is another aspect of the contradiction outlined above; effectively, transgressing duty assumes that everyone else is still duty-bound and we are only making the exception for ourselves, just once, "to the advantage of our inclination" (32-33). (When I tell a lie I assume that other people are telling the truth, and that they expect me to be truthful also—otherwise it is not to my advantage.) Clearly this violates the categorical imperative and thus is immoral from the Kantian standpoint.

Another angle from which to approach the categorical imperative involves treating all rational beings as ends in themselves rather than using them as means toward ends:

[L]et us suppose that there were something whose existence has in itself an absolute worth, something which as an end in itself could be a ground of determinate laws. In it, and in it alone, would there be the ground of a possible categorical imperative [...] Now I say that man, and in general every rational being, exists as an end in himself and not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will. He must in all his actions, whether directed to himself or to other rational beings, always be regarded at the same time as an end. (35)

This is an elaboration of sorts upon the hypothetical imperative and the major way that it differs from the categorical imperative: recall that where the categorical imperative deals only with intentionality—not with consequences—the hypothetical imperative is concerned only with consequences, and deals only with achieving specific and deliberate ends. The hypothetical imperative doesn't stand up to reasoned scrutiny for that very reason: it has its origins in contingency, not in necessity, and therefore is not universally applicable. Treating each rational being as an end in him- or herself not only accords with the categorical imperative, but that sort of equality is the imperative's very origin: the a priori moral principle exists in every rational creature, which universality was a critical element of its derivation in the first place. Treating everyone as an end and not manipulating them as a means is a nod to their equal footing with us on the moral level.

The third formation of the categorical imperative is also related to obviating contingency. It revolves around the necessity of reason only having itself in mind as it derives the imperative principle:

[J]ust because of the idea of legislating universal law such an imperative is not based on any interest, and therefore it alone of all possible imperatives can be unconditional.... if there is a categorical imperative [...] then it can only command that everything be done from the maxim of such a will as could at the same time have as its object only itself regarded as legislating universal law. (39)

This pertains more to the original formation of the categorical imperative than it does to its being put into practice (which is reasonable, as the categorical imperative is intended to transcend being put into practice). Only if the will is completely divorced from personal interest can there be a truly universal moral imperative; otherwise contingency and circumstance can influence inclination, for good or otherwise, and we fall into the trap of obeying the hypothetical imperative instead. To be truly universal—universally-applicable laws, universal treatment of other people—the will must never have consequences in mind.

The final formation that we will deal with here stems from the second formation—treating each individual rational being as an end in himself—applied toward building a unity or 'kingdom' of ends:

By "kingdom" I understand a systematic union of different rational beings through common laws. Now laws determine ends as regards their universal validity; therefore, if one abstracts from the personal differences of rational beings and also from all content of their private ends, then it will be possible to think of a whole of all ends in systematic connection (a whole both of rational beings as ends in themselves and also of the particular ends which each may set for himself); that is, one can think of a kingdom of ends that is possible on the aforesaid principles. (39)

This adds an intriguing social dimension to Kantian morality that was not necessarily present before—treating other people as ends in themselves while they do the same to you creates a sort of community ('kingdom'). But all the same it is a community that is mostly lacking personal interests or inclinations: there is an allowance for "particular ends" that an individual might have for himself, but as this is a formation of the categorical imperative, those particular ends would agree with it and be in accord with the moral good.

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Page references above come from Kant's Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. James W. Ellington, 3rd ed. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1993.

I am, like almost everyone here, a product of what is called the counter-culture. I naturally distrust authority, and believe in individualism and spontaneity. Appeals to tradition and order make me grit my teeth. I, like almost everyone else who has grown up with a mixture of tales of the 1960s, and movies where the ragtag oddballs show up the arrogant power structure, have an innate distrust of anyone who lays down any type of absolute rule. And yet in certain ways, I consider myself much more conservative than my peers, and discussions of Immanuel Kant's categorical imperative are one of the ways this always comes out. The belief that people have the ability to see their actions in terms of universal laws, and that such an ability to universalize your actions is important on a practical and spiritual level, is something that I find very important; but that many of my educated friends think is (paraphrasing loosely), a piece of authoritarian, absolutist nonsense.

And for a long time, I thought about ways to get over this seeming hurdle. And the other day, actually in the middle of a bad headache, and after some experiences that made the matter more pressing, I had a realization about what one of the major misunderstandings of the categorical imperative was.

The categorical imperative is not a rule about the way you should behave. The categorical imperative is a rule about rules.

And this greatly changed my understanding of the theoretical and practical meaning of the categorical imperative. When a person chooses to do something, they are not constrained by the categorical imperative. When someone chooses to do something, and does it because they are following a rule, the rule that they follow, however, is constrained by the categorical imperative. If you have any type of rule to guide you, you have already accepted the validity of rules.

Kant's formation of the categorical imperative was for a rational mind. One of the ways a rational mind can be described is as capable of understanding rules about the world. On the descriptive level, a rational mind understands that various different objects and phenomena are affected by the same laws and processes. A rational prescriptive mind would form prescriptive laws in the same way. It may be theoretically possible to have a rational mind with only a descriptive rationality, with no prescriptive rationality, but I think that the two go together.

Especially, (and this is where much of the anthropological, psychological application of this comes in), people make rules all the time. If there is an intelligence capable of living without prescribing, I have yet to meet it. Much as Hume said about skepticism, living even three hours with total lack of prescriptivity would be too much for anyone. Individuals, groups, societies, and nations are constantly making rules and laws. Most rules that people make don't become formal law. Most rules that people make don't even get spoken. Most societies keep their rules as a constant stream of hints, comments, glares, and tacit approval and disapproval for various behaviors. One of the main reasons that the rules don't get spoken too much, I believe, is once they are spoken, they can be critiqued. What is the basis for the rules that most societies and individuals believe in, but don't always speak?

The first example I thought of was a line from Chris Rock's book: "There's only one thing worse than a 35 year old man still living with his parents, and that's any woman willing to sneak into his room." How would this rule, the rule that adults should be economically independent, turn out when examined with the categorical imperative? This is a simple, even silly example. There are a host of other rules, stated and unstated, that are reversed quickly under the categorical imperative. People are under a constant unspoken barrage of beliefs about how they should live, work, eat, believe, dress, play, and feel. If all of these pressures were laid out clearly, would they pass the test of being universal laws?

I am sympathetic to people who claim that Kant's conception of the categorical imperative denies the deepness and uniqueness of human feeling, that the goals and movement of life is too complex to reduce to an abstract formula. But I find that in many of these cases, the real dislike of Kant's formula might be that it would disintegrate whatever small rules they put together to keep them and their clique in power.