"Were children exploited during the Industrial Revolution in
the first half of 19th century England?"
This writeup seeks to answer this very question!
Surprisingly, there is a camp of historians who believe
children were not in fact exploited.
Ever since the heyday of child labor in England during the
industrial revolution throughout the 19th century,
the public and the government have debated over whether English
factories actually exploited children. Neither side disputes that
children under the age of sixteen worked in textile and other
types of factories. The sides do not agree whether or not the
factory owners actually exploited the children. Of course, in
order to draw a conclusion on the issue one must define the term exploit. Depending on the definition, one can
draw different conclusions as to whether children were exploited
in 19th century England. However, all the models of
exploitation that result in the conclusion that child labor did
not exploit children fall short for a variety of reasons. Not
only were children exploited during the industrial revolution in
England, but also early 19th century parliamentary
legislation did little to curb the exploitation.
Clark Nardinelli, an economics professor from Clemson
University, uses three different models of exploitation: the
hard-times model, the Marxian model, and
the neoclassical model. Nardinelli reaches the conclusion that
factory owners did not exploit children in England during the
industrial revolution. His conclusion relies on the
incompleteness of the three models. In other words, Nardinelli
concludes that children were not exploited in England during the
industrial revolution because data does not satisfy his three
models.
Borrowing a term from the popular Charles Dickens novel,
Nardinelli explains the hard-times model as the emotional side
of exploitation. Topics concerning the hard-times model consist
of whether conditions were harsh for the children, and whether
the children were forced to work for a certain firm. Nardinelli
believes that one reason children were not exploited is that data
shows children had a high level of mobility to move between
factories, and often did so. He asserts that if children simply
left their job if the conditions were unsafe, then the entire
factory system would evolve to be safer. “The ability and
willingness to leave if wages or conditions were inadequate
should have limited the opportunities of employers to exploit
children.” Because some factories entertained harsher
conditions than others, Nardinelli believes children should have
left the factory if the conditions were poor. Regardless, if
conditions in any factories during 19th century
England were severe, then there were children being exploited.
Certainly, there were factories with unsafe conditions. First
hand evidence from Lord Ashley’s Mines Commission in 1842
shows evidence of dangerous conditions in the work place. One
young girl declares, “I wear a belt and chain at the
workings to get the corves out… the boys take liberties with
me; sometimes they pull me about.” Although these particular
children worked in mines and not factories, the children still
comprised the population of England’s child work force.
Nardinelli’s neoclassical model uses economic theory and
equations to test if factory owners paid children equal to their
laborious output. However, he cannot reach a conclusion because
he believes “the data can be manipulated to support any
conclusion on exploitation.” Competing data over the output
of child workers convolutes the process of mathematically
analyzing economic exploitation. Using the low range of
output estimates, Nardinelli computes that children were greatly
exploited; using the high estimate, factory owners must have
grossly overpaid the children. Regardless of whether children
were economically exploited, Nardinelli believes that a
“normative paradox” arises between neoclassical
exploitation and the hard-times model. In other words, he claims
that increased neoclassical exploitation leads to a reduction in
the number of children the factory can employ, and “reducing
the amount of child labor is (in a normative sense) a good thing.
Neoclassical exploitation is therefore a good thing if it
accompanies hard-times exploitation.” Clearly, the
endorsement of economic exploitation in order to assuage another
type of exploitation is unfounded. If a factory could pay
children less (increase normative exploitation), then the factory
could hire more children to work (increase hard-times
exploitation). Not only is the so-called paradox faulty in
theory, but also it obviously did not lessen the hard-times
exploitation in 19th century England because harsh
conditions continued to overrun British factories.
At this point in the discourse, Nardinelli abandons the
neoclassical model for the Marxian model. The Marxian model of
exploitation takes into account indirect measures of
exploitation, such as health, adult wages versus child wages,
migration and job mobility. Nardinelli approaches the health
issue with inexcusable fallacy. He claims that
“counteranecdotes” regarding the health of child
laborers cancels out the anecdotal evidence supporting
unhealthy conditions. Combining data from all the factories,
Nardinelli reaches the conclusion “that children in
factories were generally healthy.” Sadly, Nardinelli
supposes that conditions in one part of the country somehow speak
for conditions in other parts. Nardinelli admits that in some
parts of the England, child worked in unsafe factories and
because unhealthy. This fact satisfies the notion that children
working in factories were unhealthy in 19th century
England, even though not all of the children were unhealthy.
Another method Nardinelli uses to explain why children were
not exploited is to compare adult wages with the children’s
wages. Before beginning to analyze wage data, one can see the
referential problem of comparing the wages of children and
adult. If in truth adults were exploited, and children’s
wages were relatively similar to adults, then the conclusion that
children were not exploited cannot follow. To compare adult wages
with child wages cannot conclude anything about the exploitation
of children or adults unless compared with an outside standard.
Nardinelli concludes that because children worked alongside
adults, child wages must have been appropriate. Otherwise,
laborers would have only hired children. Whether children worked
alongside adults does not shed light on the issue of
exploitation. If factories exploited adults, then relative to
adult wages, children would appear to have a similar wage rate,
yet the children would be similarly exploited.
Even before the industrial revolution in England, many argued
against apprenticeship, claiming masters exploited child
apprentices. Nardinelli hails the factory system for eliminating
apprenticeship. Excuse the analogy, but such an accomplishment is
akin to the success of prostitution houses to reduce the number
of pimp-prostitute relationships in Nevada. After the invention
of the factory, owners could exploit children on a massive scale,
instead of only a handful of apprentices.
Nardinelli approaches the issue of the future prospects of
child workers with similar calamity. He attacks his
opponent’s claim that child workers have no future prospects
by stating that children “could easily be absorbed into
adult employments when they came of age.” Obviously, this
assertion says nothing as to the conditions of exploitation. In
fact, Nardinelli basically agrees that the children have no
future work opportunities other than to perform the adult version
of the labor. Nardinelli also claims that the Factory Act of
1833 did much to offer education to child factory workers. As
M. W. Thomas points on in his book, The Early Factory
Legislation, the act of 1833 had “no mention… of
education, nor was there any plan to differentiate the working
hours of the younger and the older children.”
Whether factories that hired children as laborers in the 19th
century competed against one another does not say much as to the
exploitation of children. Nardinelli admits this, and rightly so.
His lengthy data comparing competition across the child labor
market does little to prove children were not exploited. As
child labor continued on throughout the 19th century,
the British parliament did little to alleviate the exploitation
of children.
In 1802, the British parliament enacted the first significant
piece of legislation affecting factories that employ children.
This Health and Morals of Apprentices Act was the first in a
long line of ineffective British legislation. Although the bill
outlined health requirements for factory conditions, it offered
no method of enforcement. The government trusted the mill-owners
themselves to abide by the laws. Unpaid observers, usually local
subjects and not officials, would visit the factories from time
to time to check up on the mills. Still, England lacked an
effective method for enforcing the act. Thomas supposes that
“the act was fore-doomed to failure, and it was in fact,
totally ineffective.”
Sir Robert Peel, in 1815, introduced another bill to the
English parliament. The bill became law in 1819, and the act of
1802 would see amended provisions for paid inspections.
Parliament based the bill on the evidence given by the Select
Committee in April of 1815. Many witnesses claimed children
could work long hours, while other claimed otherwise. A four-year
debate raged on, while factories throughout England continued to
exploit children. Finally, once the bill passed, the government
established age limitations on workers. Again, Thomas discusses
the failure of this legislation. “The Act was admittedly
defective and it remained a dead letter.” Six years would go
by until parliament would pass another act regarding child labor
in factories.
In 1831, child labor suffered a great setback when parliament
passed an act that repealed all enactments since 1802. Thomas
remarks that the act reiterated the legality of factories to hire
and use child labor throughout the night. The act retained the
earliest age of employment at nine, but required mill owners to
keep a “time book,” which was to be submitted to
magistrates for review. Unfortunately, this piece of legislation
sufficiently satisfied British lawmakers, who would not pass
another law regarding child labor until the Parliament was
reformed later in the century.
Parliament passed another Factory Act in
1844. This legislation reduced the work hours of children in
factories to six hours per day. A large part of the act was to
make provisions for superintendents and factory inspectors. Alas,
factory owners found ways to curtail the effectiveness of the new
law. Mill owners would frequently hide illegally employed
children while the inspectors were in the factory. Also, mill
owners enjoyed the right to reject state recommended
superintendents. Although the price of cotton, for example,
fell due to the decrease in child labor, children were
continually exploited under the legislation of the Factory Act of
1844.
Clearly, regardless of Nardinelli’s objections to the
fact that children were exploited in 19th century
England during the industrial revolution, the English parliament
did little to effectively limit the amount of child labor. While
children continued to work throughout England in mills,
factories, and mines, the parliament discussed petty issues and
entertained long-winded committees. After forty-two years of
debate, a semi-effective law finally passed in 1844, however the
exploitation of children pressed on.
Use of Passive Voice in this Writeup:
I used much passive voice in this writeup because the phrase "were exploited" emphasizes the powerlessness of the children hired for labor.
References:
Nardinelli, Clark. Child Labor and the Industrial
Revolution. Indianapolis, Indiana: Indiana University Press,
1990
Thomas, M.W. The Early Factory Legislation.
Southend-on-Sea, England: The Thames Bank Publishing Company
Limited, 1948
Weber, Eugen. The Western Tradition. Lexington,
Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1995